Mood and modality

Modality as a semantic concept

As a semantics concept, modality is not tied to a particular grammatical form or category. This is not true of the term “verbal mood” (introduced in 16.2.3), which is, as the name suggests, tied to the grammatical category of the “verb.” Modal meanings can, then, be found in every grammatical category: Paul’s potential trip to Spain would be next year (adjective), The possibility that Paul would go to Spain next year is a real one (noun), Paul might go to Spain next year (verb). The sentences with potential, possibility, and might all have in common the fact that Paul’s trip is not described as having been actualized in the real world. Different modal words can be used to indicate varying levels of uncertainty. Replacing potential with probable, possibility with certainty, and might with must … be going increases the degree of certainty expressed. In each case, we are still not talking about the real world, but the chances of the world being describing becoming the real world is higher when we use probable trip rather than potential trip. Thus, modal expressions allow us to make fine-grained distinctions about how likely we think eventualities are to occur in the real world.

Semanticists refer to the degree of certainty expressed in a modal word as the strength of modality, also sometimes called the modal force. Modal strength has been analyzed in different ways in the literature, but historically modals have been described as essentially quantifiers over possible worlds. If you recall from our discussion of quantifiers in Semantics B, the two basic kinds of quantifiers are universal quantifiers and existential quantifiers. A word like all falls into the former category, and some would fall into the latter. When we say All the apostles left Jerusalem, we mean that the entire set of people who are apostles engaged in the event of leaving Jerusalem. In contrast, Some apostle left Jerusalem means that (at least) one left. The quantifier we choose (all or some) determines the number of apostles we are talking about. Analogously, the type of modal we choose determines the number of possible worlds we are talking about. The word must is a universal modal like all is a universal quantifier, so it is referring to all of something.

By way of illustration, let us assume that the speaker is evaluating 5 different scenarios of what the real world will be like next year with regard to Paul’s trip to Spain. These are the “possible worlds” that the speaker references with the modal word must. Since must is a universal quantifier, a sentence with must means that, in all 5 possible worlds, Paul goes to Spain. Thus, Paul must be going to Spain next year is normally uttered by a speaker who is certain about the chances of Paul going to Spain. The equivalent sentence with the existential modal might is much weaker in that the speaker only commits to at least 1 world being a world in which Paul goes to Spain. Again, this is the same as what we saw with some, which only requires 1 individual to fit whatever description we have given. In English, the modal verbs can / could, might, and may are typically regarded as existential modals, and must, ought, and have to are universal modals (with should often being treated as something in between and will/would being universal or getting its own analysis).

The strength of the modal expression is not the only relevant parameter of modality. The two sentences Paul must be going to Spain next year and Paul must go to Spain next year involve two different kinds of modality. The former can be paraphrased with something like In light of what I know, Paul must be going to Spain next year, but the latter would be paraphrased with In light of his obligations, Paul must go to Spain next year. The distinction reflected in these two instances of must is called the type of modality, also sometimes called the modal flavor. When must is used to talk about the speaker’s knowledge, it is called epistemic modality. When it is used to talk about someone’s obligations, it is called deontic modality. Many other types of modality have been proposed in the literature as well, such as dynamic modality (having to do with what one is able to do), permissive modality (having to do with what one is allowed to do) and teleological modality (having to do with one’s goals). Modal auxiliary verbs in English (such as might, can, must, should, etc.) are specified for the strength of modality but not the type, though the English modals often constrain the type of modality as well. Certain flavors of modality can have varying levels of strength (universal or existential), and others always have one type. Of the five types of modality given above, only epistemic modality can be either an existential modal or a universal modal, e.g. Paul might/must be going to Spain next year are existential/universal epistemic modals. Deontic modality is universal (it is necessary in light of one’s obligations, e.g. Paul must go to Spain next year), while permissive modality is existential (it is possible in light of one’s permissions, e.g. Paul may go to Spain next year). Dynamic modality is existential (it is possible to do something in light of one’s abilities, e.g. Paul can go to Spain next year now that he is out of prison), and teleological modality is universal (it is necessary to do something in light of one’s goals, e.g. Paul must go to Spain next year to preach the gospel there). Although English uses modal auxiliary verbs to express modal meanings, other languages, including Greek, express modal meanings using different means, including markings on the verb.

Verbal mood

Whereas modality is a semantic category that cuts across grammatical categories, verbal mood is a morphological category. According to Portner (2011), it is an inflection on a verb form that marks the presence or absence of a modal meaning or a particular sentential mood (more on sentential mood below). We introduced infinitives, subjunctives, and optatives as verbal moods. They are morphological categories in the sense that they are marked on the verb – the verbal inflection changes, and these inflections indicate the presence of a modal meaning.

When we introduced the infinitive, we said it can be used as the complement of some verbs (16.2.4.2), or it can be used to introduce the purpose or reason why an action is being done (27.2.4.2). The following two examples illustrate these two uses (repetitions of (137) and (248) respectively):

• (573) Complement of a verb of desire
• ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐπεθύμησα τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα φαγεῖν μεθ’ ὑμῶν (Luke 22:15)
• I have greatly desired to eat this Passover with you
• (574) Adjunct introducing purpose καὶ ἀνέστη ἀναγνῶναι (Luke 4:16)
• And he stood up to read

Having more fully introduced the concept of modality, we are now able to better understand how these two uses of the infinitive conform to the definition we have given it, namely indicating the presence of modality. A verb like ἐπιθυμεῖ ‘desire’ refers to a state that makes reference to a potential, or unreal, eventuality. Thus, this verb is modal (note that it is the lexical item, i.e. the verb, that is modal here, not the verbal form), since the desired eventuality is only potential. This unreal eventuality is referred to by a verb in the infinitive, since the infinitive indicates the presence of a modal meaning. Infinitives, then, may be used as complements to certain kinds of modal verbs because they mark the presence of the modal meaning in the modal verb. In contrast, the verb ἀνέστη ‘stood up’ does not have a modal meaning. Standing up is not logically connected to another potential event in any way. Therefore, the infinitive cannot be treated as a complement to the verb; that is, it does not complete the thought of the verb. Rather, the infinitive introduces the reason why the subject engaged in the event of standing. An eventuality that refers to a reason is only a possibility, i.e. it has not yet been actualized in the world. Since infinitives indicate the presence of a modal meaning but no such modal meaning is contributed by the verb, the infinitive itself must contribute a type of modality in this context, namely a potential event desired by the subject. Although the categorization of the type of modality depends on how we define our terms, we might, broadly speaking, define both of these examples as instances of teleological modality. Both are also existential modals, since the eventualities they refer to are only possible and are not necessary.

The subjunctive mood can be analyzed in a similar way. Like the infinitive, it can be used in the complement of verbs of desire:

• (575) Complement of a verb of desire (with ἵνα)
• θέλομεν ἵνα ὃ ἐὰν αἰτήσωμέν σε ποιήσῃς ἡμῖν (Mark 10:35)
• We desire that whatever we might request from you, you would do for us

As expected, the same verb θέλω is found with an infinitival complement (Mark 9:35). This suggests that the modal meaning selected by θέλω is compatible with the type of modality encoded by both the infinitive and the subjunctive, but other modal verbs have a different distribution with verbal moods. The following chart lists the verbs that select complements in the subjunctive, infinitive, or optative:

This chart should be comprehensive for the New Testament (though some examples are debatable, and one or two may have been missed here or there). It shows us that there is a fair bit of overlap between the subjunctive and infinitive, but they also each have their own unique characteristics. Of course, there are some verbs that may only be found with a certain complement in the NT, but they may still be compatible with another kind of complement if a broader Greek corpus was considered. Still, there are noticeable differences. The infinitive often serves as the complement of temporal verbs, such as ἄρχω ‘start’, but this entire class of verbs is absent from the subjunctive list. Similarly, verbs that refer to dynamic modality, such as δύναμαι and ἰσχύω, are only found with infinitive complements. On the other hand, the praying verbs δέομαι and προσεύχομαι are only found with ἵνα and the subjunctive as a complement.

In addition to modal verbs, some nouns are also modal and allow for their content to be explicated by ἵνα + subjunctive. Example (575) showed that the verb θέλω can have a ἵνα + subjunctive complement, and the noun θέλημα also allows for this:

(576) Subjunctive complement of θέλημα with ἵνα

τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, ἵνα πᾶν ὃ δέδωκέν μοι μὴ ἀπολέσω ἐξ αὐτοῦ (John 6:39)

This is the will of the one who sent me, that I might not lose anything which he has given me from him

The ἵνα clause provides the content of the θέλημα ‘will’ referenced in the previous clause. Because a θέλημα is something that can be done and the subjunctive is regularly used for deontic modality (specifying what someone is obligated to do), the thing that should be done can be referred to by the subjunctive. Besides θέλημα, other nouns or phrases that can take the subjunctive are ἀγαθός, ἀγάπη, ἀγῶνα ἔχω, ἀναγκαῖος, ἀνάκρισις, ἄξιος, ἀρκετός, βάλλω εἰς καρδίαν, βουλή, δέησις, διὰ τοῦτο, δίκαιος, εἰς τοῦτο, ἐντολή, ἐξουσία, ἔργον, ἱκανός, μισθός, πιστός, προσευχή, συνήθεια, χαρά, and χρείαν ἔχω. Each of these words has a modal meaning in at least one of their uses, and because the subjunctive can be used as a syntactic complement, this modal meaning is compatible with the modal meaning contributed by the subjunctive.

The optative mood has its own distribution. As we said in 47.3.3.2, it is used for modal statements that are often more uncertain, i.e. for existential modals rather than universal modals. The verb ἀνακρίνω ‘investigate’ uses the optative mood and can take a complement that is possibly true:

(577) Optative as existential modal in complement clause

• καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀνακρίνοντες τὰς γραφὰς εἰ ἔχοι ταῦτα οὕτως (Acts 17:11)
• Every day they were investigating the scriptures whether it might contain these things

The verb ἀνακρίνω takes εἰ as its complementizer in this example with ἔχοι being found in the optative. This verse is referencing a group of Jews (the Berean Jews) who were eagerly trying to determine the truth of what Paul said. Since they were investigating the scriptures, they thought it was possible that what he said was true, but they were not certain. In this context, the optative verbal mood is used because it specifies a certain modal strength, namely existential modality. This is not to suggest that the subjunctive and infinitive cannot be used for existential modality. Both can be, and this is probably why the optative eventually fell out of use.

Besides the verbal moods expressing modal meanings, the future also has a modal element according to the standard analysis of it in the semantics literature (see Copley 2009). Since the future necessarily refers to something that is not known (at least not in the way the past can be known), semanticists have recognized that it has some element of possibility. Indeed, many future forms, including the Greek Luso, can express other kinds of modality in addition to the purely temporal configuration of the RT following the TA. Thus, indicative verbal mood is not wholly incompatible with modal meanings of possibility or necessity – the indicative simply does not mark that meaning as necessarily present, though some other element in the context may be contributing that meaning. As we saw in 26.1.3.2, the Luso form may be used to report obligations, i.e. it may express deontic modality:

(578) Deontic use of the future

• οὐκ ἔσεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταί (Matt 6:5)
• You should not be like the hypocrites

When combining with adverbs that refer to epistemic uncertainty, we find both the indicative present and future forms:

• (579) Epistemic modality with future indicative
• ἴσως τοῦτον ἐντραπήσονται (Luke 20:13)
• Perhaps they will respect him
• (580) Epistemic modality with present indicative
• ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τάχα τις καὶ τολμᾷ ἀποθανεῖν (Rom 5:7)
• Maybe someone might dare to die for a good person

Our definition of verbal mood would require us to link each of the morphological forms to the type, presence, or absence of modality. As we cautioned in our discussion of tense and aspect, this is a case where our notional categories may not neatly fit our morphological categories. The chart above clearly demonstrates that the subjunctive, infinitive, and optative do not have the same modal meaning, but it is not as if the subjunctive allows for epistemic modal readings and the others do not. The indicative also does not contribute a modal meaning, but it is not incompatible with one. Given that there is not even agreement in the linguistics literature on how best to divide the various modal flavors we find, it is not possible to straightforwardly associate each of the verbal moods with particular modal flavors or strengths. Despite these limitations, the following chart shows the kinds of modal meanings we find for each of the verbal moods. I separate out the verbal mood as found in independent clauses in contrast to dependent clauses (as complements to verbs) and provide an example of the main verb for the latter.

Sentence mood

Recall that we defined verbal mood as “an inflection on a verb form that marks the presence or absence of a modal meaning or a particular sentential mood .” To illustrate the concept of sentence moods, consider the following contrasts:

• (581) Jamie is running.
• (582) Is Jamie running?
• (583) Run, Jamie!

Portner (2018) notes that the distinction between (581), (582), and (583) is commonly described as one of mood, particularly sentence mood. More precisely, (581) is declarative mood, (582) is interrogative mood, and (583) is imperative mood. Each of these moods has a prototypical function. Declaratives are prototypically used to make assertions, interrogatives are used to ask for information, and imperatives are used to make commands. Each of the sentences has a unique clause type. The declarative sentence exhibits SV order, while the interrogative has VS order, and the imperative allows for the subject to be dropped altogether. These formal, syntactic characteristics of a particular mood are what we mean by clause type. Unlike English, Greek has a separate imperative morphological form, so τρέχε ‘run’ in Greek would not only be in imperative sentential mood, but it is a verbal mood that signals a particular sentence mood.

The unique syntactic characteristics of each mood are paired with certain meanings. Suppose a black bear has just come out of its den after hibernating, and it startles Jamie’s friend. If she yells Run, Jamie!, she is commanding Jamie to do something, and he might respond with No, I won’t; it isn’t good to run from black bears. However, a response of That isn’t true would be inappropriate even if Jamie thinks black bears should not be run from. Because we cannot question the truthfulness of an imperative, it seems as though imperatives are neither true nor false. In other words, imperatives do not have truth conditions, or conditions under which we can determine the truthfulness or falsity of the statement. In contrast, the declarative sentence Jamie is running has truth conditions—if Jamie is engaged in the act of running at the relevant time, the sentence is true. While declarative statements have truth conditions, imperatives can be said to have obedience conditions, or conditions which must be met in order to comply with the directive. If Jamie runs, he has complied; if he does not, he has not complied. The question Is Jamie running? has neither truth conditions nor obedience conditions, but it has resolution conditions, or conditions under which the question could be said to be answered. All possible valid answers would resolve the question (e.g. Yes, he is running) while invalid answers would leave the question unresolved (e.g. Squirrels run fast leaves the question unresolved).4 Following terminology used by Boisvert and Ludwig (2008), we will use the term satisfaction conditions to refer to the conditions associated with a particular sentence mood. In light of this concept, sentence mood can be defined as a morpho-syntactic property of a sentence which signals a certain type of satisfaction condition.

Satisfaction conditions come with prototypical functions; crucially, however, it is not the case that the “prototypical function” of the sentence moods given above are used every time the given clause type appears. Questions, for example, need not be requests for information. Rhetorical questions, by definition, are not requests for information, since the speaker already knows the answer to the question being asked (see 45.4.3.1 for more details). Imperatives are prototypically used for commands, but they can also be used for suggestions (38.3.3.2), wishes (39.3.3.2), and granting permission, an example for which is given here:

(584) Imperative as granting permission

• οἱ δὲ δαίμονες παρεκάλουν αὐτὸν λέγοντες· εἰ ἐκβάλλεις ἡμᾶς, ἀπόστειλον ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀγέλην τῶν χοίρων. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· ὑπάγετε. (Matt 8:31–32)

But the demons urged him saying, ‘If you cast us out, send us to the herd of pigs,’ and he said, ‘ Go !’

These examples demonstrate that there may be a mismatch between a sentence mood’s prototypical function and its intended function in context. Following Portner’s (2018) terminology, I call the prototypical function of a sentence mood its sentential force. Put differently, sentential force is the prototypical use of a sentence mood with particular satisfaction conditions. Because the satisfaction conditions are part of the definition we have given for sentence mood, the sentential force does not change even when the speaker’s intended function for the sentence changes. The speaker’s intended function in context is called the illocutionary force of the utterance, a term originating from the philosopher J. L. Austin and which is used prominently in John Searle’s “Speech-act theory.” A sentence like (584) is in imperative mood, so it has the sentential force of giving a command, but the illocutionary force is to grant permission.

Besides the three basic sentence moods described above, we may also include the optative and exclamative moods in Greek. The optative verbal mood and 3rd person imperatives are regularly used to express a wish of the speaker:

• (585) Optative for wish εἶπεν δὲ Μαριάμ· ἰδοὺ ἡ δούλη κυρίου· γένοιτό μοι κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμά σου. (Luke 1:38)
• Mary said, ‘Behold, I am the Lord’s servant. May it happen to me according to your word’
• ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου, ἐλθέτω ἡ βασιλεία σου, γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου (Matt 6:9c–10)
• May your name be made holy, may your kingdom come, may your will be done

In neither of these examples does the relevant clause have truth conditions. A wish that something would happen is neither true nor false. Instead, a wish may be fulfilled or remain unfulfilled, so we may speak of fulfillment conditions, or conditions which must be fulfilled in order for the wish to come to pass. These examples also demonstrate that a sentence mood may be expressed with a variety of different clause types. Optative sentence mood may be marked with optative verbal mood or imperative verbal mood. Not only, then, is there potentially a one-to-many mapping between clause type and function in context (as we saw with the imperative above), but there may also be a one-to-many mapping between sentence mood and clause type.

Exclamatives (introduced briefly in 45.4.3.1) often share some formal characteristics with questions (as they do in English in a sentence like What an awesome job you did!), but they have a distinct meaning, and not all exclamatives share the form of questions. Rather than using the WH-word to ask for information, the question word acts to signal some sort of surprise, either that a surprising state holds or that something holds to a surprisingly high degree:

• (587) Exclamation that an event took place
• ποταπός ἐστιν οὗτος ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ ἡ θάλασσα αὐτῷ ὑπακούουσιν; (Matt 8:27)
• What sort of person is this, that even the winds and sea obey him!
• (588) Exclamation that something holds to a high degree
• πῶς δύσκολόν ἐστιν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσελθεῖν; (Mark 10:24)
• How difficult it is to enter the kingdom of God?

An exclamative can be sincere or insincere. Hence, we may speak of sincerity conditions, or conditions under which the statement made by the speaker reflects his or her mental attitude. Again, we conclude from these examples that the same clause type (having a question word) can express different sentence moods (either interrogative or exclamative) and can, therefore, be associated with different sentential forces. As is often the case, there probably was a phonological distinction between exclamatives and interrogatives, but we cannot know for certain whether this distinction was present in Greek and how it sounded if it was. Besides exclamatives that look like questions, Greek also allows exclamatives that look more like assertions, whether marked or unmarked:

(589) Exclamation using non-question word

• Ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ· ὡς ἀνεξεραύνητα τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ (Rom 11:33)
• Oh the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and inscrutable his ways!
• (590) Unmarked exclamative
• δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας (Luke 2:14)
• Glory to God in the highest, and peace on earth among his approved people!

The two exclamatory clauses in Rom 11:33 seem to be signaled by Ὦ and ὡς. A degree word then follows which refers to the surprisingly high degree that holds in the exclamatory clause. Luke 2:14 has no formal marker of an exclamation. Both clauses lack the copula verb ἐστίν, which is normal for these kinds of constructions (though ἐστίν is present in exclamations with question words, as the above examples illustrate).

Using the tools we have laid out, it is worth dispelling a common misconception about the indicative mood. Grammars commonly describe the indicative mood as asserting something or having to do with facts: “the indicative mood represents something as certain or asserted … the author or speaker is choosing to present his speech as factual, at least for consideration” (Köstenberger, Merkle, and Plummer 2020:40; bold original); and “The primary use of the indicative mood in NT Greek is to make assertions about reality from the perspective of the writer or speaker, irrespective of objective reality. Nevertheless, the indicative mood may also be employed when asking questions, issuing commands, making wishes, or framing certain types of conditions” (Matthewson & Ballantine Emig 2016:161); and “It [the indicative mood] is in short the mood of an author’s portrayal of fact and factual statements. This does not mean that an author necessarily believes in the truthfulness of the statement, but only that he/she is portraying a statement as real or true” (Long 2004:26). Similar examples could be multiplied in both introductory and intermediate grammars.

What all of these statements have in common is that they say that the indicative mood is used for assertions, as if something were factual, but they want to qualify this by noting (correctly) that not all indicative statements are true, and assertions are not the only kind of sentential force associated with indicative mood. Using the tools we have introduced, we can more accurately describe indicative mood. To associate indicative mood with assertions is to make indicative verbal mood a morphological signal for declarative sentence mood. However, we have already seen that a particular verbal mood (such as indicative) may be used for a variety of sentence moods (such as declarative and interrogative). As these authors have all noted, indicative verbal mood is regularly used in interrogative sentence mood, and we have also seen it in exclamatives. This suggests, of course, that indicative verbal mood is simply not a marker of declarative sentence mood. It is true that indicative verbal mood may be used in assertions, but that does not entail that indicative verbal mood necessarily signals an assertion is being made. All the authors cited recognize this. Moreover, even if the indicative was a marker of declarative mood, which it is not, the illocutionary force of the speaker in context may be different from the sentential force normally carried by declarative sentence mood. It is time, then, that the connection between indicative verbal mood and “statement of fact” be severed – indicative verbal mood does not signal an assertion is being made. It is not a grammatical means of asserting the factuality of something.

If the indicative verbal mood does not signal declarative sentence mood, what is it? Given that the indicative mood may or may not have truth conditions (being used in assertions, questions, and exclamatives) and it may or may not have a modal meaning (being used in both conditionals and statements about the real world), I suggest that the indicative mood simply means nothing. As boring as that conclusion is, it fits the data far better than suggesting that the indicative mood makes a statement about the real world (i.e. is not modal) or asserts something. Both of those statements are demonstrably false. The only thing that the indicative mood tells us is that the conditions for one of the other marked moods is not present.

Finally, it is also worth clarifying the relationship between modality and sentence moods. In recent scholarship, Mathewson (2021:100) has claimed not only that the indicative mood refers to an assertion, but that all non-indicative moods are non-assertive, creating a binary system (italics original; bold added):

… the indicative mood in Greek can be seen as grammaticalizing the semantic, attitudinal feature of assertion … Through the selection of the indicative mood form, the author/speaker chooses to make an assertion about the action’s relationship to reality (the other nonindicative mood forms will make no such assertion), putting forth the conception of the action as reality.

This reflects a misunderstanding of the notion of assertion. To assert something is to assert it as true, i.e. it is the use of a clause with truth-conditions. Subjunctives and infinitives are modal, but they are also normally assertions:

• (591) Subjunctive as an assertion
• οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός (John 1:7)
• He came as a witness in order to witness about the light

Modal statements are assertions, even if they make reference to possible worlds. In John 1:7, an assertion about John’s intentions is made, and this assertion is either true or false. Either John’s intentions for coming were to witness about the light or they were not. However, this assertion is not in indicative mood and it is not a factual statement about the real world, but assertions need not be about the real world. Statements about possible worlds may also be true or false, i.e. they may be assertions.

To conclude, we have seen that each of the sentence moods has its own distinct sentential force and satisfaction conditions, but they are not distinct in clause type. In other words, the sentence moods are not always marked with unique formal syntactic features. It is certainly not the case that indicative verbal mood marks a particular sentence mood, but none of the verbal moods can be said to uniquely signal a sentence mood. Moreover, the sentence moods themselves can be used with a variety of different illocutionary forces in context. The following chart summarizes the characteristics of each of the sentence moods.

7 Like those who define aspect non-temporally, the definitions of mood and modality espoused in Mathewson (2021), who follows Porter (1992), lead to incorrect analyses. Without the correct foundation, the data cannot be explained by these models.

Conclusion

To conclude this section, it may be helpful to summarize the relationship between modality, verbal mood, and sentence mood. Because modality has to do with the possibility or necessity of an eventuality, it is possible in both declarative and interrogative mood, both of which may refer to eventualities. The imperative, optative, and exclamative sentence moods are different in that eventualities are not talked about with these moods, but the speaker expresses an attitude towards the eventuality itself (e.g. it being something that should be done, is wished for, or is surprising). In complement clauses, the subjunctive, infinitive, and optative verbal mood are regularly used to indicate the presence of some modal element in the context, often in the verb itself, but also potentially in a noun. In their uses in declarative or interrogative sentence moods, each of these verbal moods indicates that a certain type or strength of modal meaning is present in the context. The imperative verbal mood, in contrast, signals either imperative or optative sentence mood, and it can never be embedded under a modal verb (suggesting that it does not mark a type of modality). Besides the imperative verbal mood, the various sentential forces are mainly expressed using question words (for interrogatives and exclamatives) and other verbal moods, namely the optative, subjunctive, and imperative.

This discussion suggests that our notional categories (be it type/strength of modality or type of sentence mood) do not neatly align with Greek’s morphological categories (that is, particular verbal moods). As noted in our discussion of Greek’s tense and aspect markers, this is neither problematic nor surprising. Languages “reuse” the same morpheme for multiple purposes. Differentiating between a form’s various functions involves, first and foremost, careful attention to the syntactic context in which the verbal mood is found. One last table summarizes the various meanings associated with each of the verbal moods: